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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following situations: The ﬁrst involves Ashley, a thirteenyear-old girl who went out one night with her friends. They vandalized a local
museum, throwing paint on the walls of a restored historical building and
breaking windows. Afterward, Ashley got in a ﬁght. The police detained Ashley,
and contacted her parents with a request they pick her up. She eventually went to
juvenile court. During adjudication, the judge learned Ashley had been physically
abused, diagnosed with clinical depression, and was rarely supervised by her
parents. She had also been in trouble with the law before. The judge ordered
Ashley to help clean up the damage to the museum and attend counseling and
anger management classes through a local mental health agency. No ﬁne was

* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2008. B.S. University of Wyoming 2005. I
would like to my wife, Alicia, for all her encouragement and patience. I would also like to thank Bill
Matonte for providing background information.
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assessed and her actions are not available for public perusal. The state expended
$100,000 in supervision, counseling and other support services for Ashley, and
her family received therapeutic intervention to resolve family issues. Ashley was
properly medicated and her anger problems were addressed. By the time she was
eighteen years old, Ashley was enrolled in college. Because of the juvenile court’s
intervention, she functions as a productive member of society. Over her lifetime,
Ashley’s contributions to the state coffers by being educated and employed
may offset the expenditures made toward her rehabilitation. This is particularly
encouraging in light of the possibility that Ashley could have continued her
criminal behavior as an adult, further draining the state’s resources.
The last situation involves John, a ﬁfteen-year-old attending high school in
Wyoming. He received a ticket for stealing a key to one of the doors in the school.
He signed the ticket promising to appear in court with a parent. Approximately
one month later, John was called out of science class, placed in handcuffs, taken to
the juvenile detention center in Casper, and deloused. When picking John up at
the jail, his father learned John had been arrested on a bench warrant for failure to
appear. Had his parents been aware of the mandatory appearance at the time John
was cited, they would have assured his appearance in court. The municipal court
heard John’s case, ﬁned him $160 and ordered him to perform thirty-two hours of
community service. There was no effort to adjudicate him as a juvenile. Because
he was tried in an adult court, his adoption and behavioral issues stemming from
his pre-adoption childhood were not considered. He was given a punitive sentence
which may not have been in the best interests of John or society.
What is the difference in the treatment of these juveniles under these
hypothetical scenarios? Could the state have helped John? Did he need the same
types of services that Ashley received? The answers are all yes, but Juvenile Justice
does not work that way in Wyoming. The different outcomes are possible under
the Wyoming Juvenile Justice Act since Wyoming often deals with juveniles in a
manner similar to the way John was adjudicated.
This comment examines Wyoming’s Juvenile Justice Act (Act), and explores
one case that illuminates the failures, illegalities, and inconsistencies of the Act.
D.D. v. City of Casper, Wyo. contains facts similar to those mentioned in the second
scenario. A sixteen-year-old boy, D.D., was cited for stealing a key worth less
than twenty dollars.1 Approximately one month later he was pulled from his high

1
Brief of Appellant at 2, D.D. v. City of Casper, Wyo., Seventh Judicial District Criminal
Action No. 16885-A (Dec. 4, 2005). This case was tried in municipal court, and the actual name of
the juvenile is in the decision letter. Out of respect for the parties and the comment author’s belief
that this case should have been adjudicated in a juvenile court, the initials D.D. have been used to
protect the name of the individual.
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school class, placed in handcuffs and taken to jail.2 At the jail he was deloused and
then his parents were notiﬁed of his arrest.3
In Wyoming, juveniles are split into two groups by the jurisdictional provisions
in the Act.4 Comprising one group are those who commit delinquent acts under
the age of thirteen over which the juvenile courts have exclusive jurisdiction.5
The other group is made up of juveniles ages thirteen to eighteen who commit
delinquent acts over whom the juvenile court has concurrent jurisdiction.6
The broad granting of concurrent jurisdiction in the Act that allows absolute
prosecutorial discretion violates the due process and equal protection rights of
Wyoming juveniles.7 The majority of Wyoming juveniles in Natrona County
never get the opportunity to appear in juvenile court where the rehabilitative
nature would be extended to all of them.8 D.D., a male youth tried in Natrona
County Municipal Court, did not get this opportunity.9
Case law and statutes suggest juveniles have a right to be adjudicated in
juvenile court.10 By granting concurrent jurisdiction over juveniles ages thirteen
to eighteen, the Act allows unchecked, absolute prosecutorial discretion to decide
if a juvenile’s case is heard in juvenile court.11 Natrona County adjudicated ninety
percent of juveniles as adults in 2004.12 Under the Wyoming Rational Basis Test,
broad granting of concurrent jurisdiction violates juveniles’ constitutional rights
to due process and equal protection.13
This is not a unique occurrence. According to the ruling in D.D. achieving
judicial efﬁciency is the crux of the argument in support of this disparate
treatment.14 Investing state time and money in juveniles who commit minor
2

Id.

3

Anthony Lane, A Missing Key, CASPER STAR TRIBUNE, Aug. 28, 2006, at A1 and A11.

4

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-203 (a)-(d) (2007).

5

Id. at § 14-6-203(d).

6

Id. at § 14-6-203(c) (2007).

7

See discussion infra Part III.D.

8

See infra note 31 and accompanying text.

9

D.D.v. City of Casper, Wyo., Seventh Judicial Dist., Criminal Action No. 16885-A (Dec.
4, 2005).
10

See discussion infra Part III.B.

11

See infra notes 161-65 and accompanying text (citing Kelley v. Kaiser, 992 F.2d 1509, 1511
(10th Cir. 1993)).
12
Wyoming Survey and Analysis Center, Youth Case Processing in the State of Wyoming:
An Analysis of Four Counties Report to the Wyoming Department of Family Services, 12-13
(2004), available at http://www.uwyo.edu/wysac/CrimJustice/JuvenileCourtProcessing/docs/
DFS%20Final%20Report.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2007) [hereinafter WYSAC].
13

See Discussion infra Part III.F.

14

D.D., Criminal Action No. 16885-A at 11.
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crimes is not important according to the ruling in D.D.15 Applied to D.D., it was
more efﬁcient to adjudicate him in circuit court, impose a ﬁne and/or community
service, and send him on his way without ever delving into whether or not there
were underlying circumstances contributing to his actions.16 In contrast, juvenile
offenders rehabilitated by early interventions may not become societal burdens as
adults.
Juveniles are tried and convicted of non-violent misdemeanor crimes every
day in Wyoming. Statistics show the vast majority of them, at least in four
Wyoming counties, are tried or adjudicated in an adult court, not subject to
the rehabilitative nature of an almost non-existent juvenile justice system in
Wyoming.17 This comment examines D.D. to address the right and duty of
parents to appear with their child in court and the right of a juvenile to have the
opportunity to be heard in court. Further, this comment addresses a juvenile’s
right to due process, Wyoming’s constitutional problems by granting concurrent
jurisdiction in juvenile cases (including the constitutionality of a prosecutor’s
absolute discretion concerning juveniles), and touches on Wyoming’s Rational
Basis Test for constitutionality of current juvenile justice statutes in Wyoming.
This comment exposes confusion in the statutes and advocates legislative changes
to provide clear criterion so juvenile justice will be consistently applied throughout
the state.

II. BACKGROUND
A. Evolution of Juvenile Justice
Juveniles were ﬁrst recognized as “different” from adults in the eyes of the
justice system in the 1700s.18 As a result, social transformations began when
minors were no longer perceived as “miniature adults” but were viewed as having
different needs.19 However, not until 1899 in Cook County, Illinois, was the
ﬁrst juvenile justice court established.20 The Cook County Juvenile Court was
based on the premise that more thought should be put into rehabilitating and
preventing crimes in young offenders.21 This rehabilitative ideal promoted the

15

Id.

16

Id.

17

See infra note 31.

18

Howard N. Snyder, and Melissa Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 2006 Report,
Washington DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Ofﬁce of Justice Programs, Ofﬁce of Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention, 94 (2006), available at http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/
downloads/NR2006.pdf.
19

Id.

20

Id.

21

Id.
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belief that modiﬁcation of human behavior was possible.22 As the public perceived
a surge in juvenile criminal activity early in the twentieth century, legislation was
enacted across the country to deal with young offenders.23 The federal standards
for juvenile justice are found in the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Act (hereafter “JJDPA”).24 Wyoming was the last state to enact a juvenile code in
1945.25

B. Findings of the National Center for Juvenile Justice and the Wyoming
Survey and Analysis Center Report
The goals of juvenile justice systems have generally been to rehabilitate, aid,
and guide youthful offenders into becoming law-abiding citizens.26 Wyoming,
however, amended the original guide to include an emphasis on punishment and
“law and order.”27 The National Center for Juvenile Justice (NCJJ), in conjunction
with the Wyoming Survey and Analysis Center (WYSAC), published a study in
2004 that found numerous problems with the Act.28 Speciﬁcally, the NCJJ stated
the “purpose clause is an amalgam of contradictory and competing concerns that
have created conﬂict over how to respond to the best interests of the child and
protect the community.” 29
The report also found no other state restricts access for juveniles to juvenile
court or favors processing juvenile offenders as adults.30 Additionally, the majority
of court activity in Wyoming addressing criminal behavior of minors occurred
in adult courts in the study counties.31 The ﬁndings also noted police ofﬁcers
and sheriff deputies “essentially control the gate into the justice system for many
juvenile offenders.”32 For the most part, these same ofﬁcers also decide which

22
Marygold S.Melli, Symposium: Juvenile Justice Reform: Introduction: Juvenile Justice Reform
in Context, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 375, 376-77 (1996) (citing Francis A. Allen, The Border Land of
Criminal Justice 26 (1964)).
23

Allan B. Korpela, Annotation, Expungement of Juvenile Court Records, 71 A.L.R. 3d 753

(1976).
24

The JJDPA is codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. § 5633 (approved 2007).

25

Wyoming State Advisory Council on Juvenile Justice, Annual Report to the Governor, Jan.
3, 2003.
26

Snyder & Sickmund, supra note 18, at 94.

27

Id. at 97-99.

28

WYSAC, supra note 12, at 12-13.

29

Id.

30

Id.

31

Id. at 12 (citing 70% in Teton County, 85% in Sweetwater County, 93% in Sheridan
County, and 97% in Natrona County).
32

Id.
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cases to forward to the county attorney who considers whether or not to prosecute
in juvenile court.33
The report found concurrent jurisdiction can result “in the co-occurring
involvement of a juvenile in more than one court at the same time.”34 As a
result, “[t]his phenomenon can foster a number of problems, not the least of
which include conﬂicts between the different courts’ expectations and orders,
duplication of effort, and public confusion over which court takes precedence.”35
Even though Wyoming’s concurrent jurisdiction issue was not the focal point of
the study, interviews of various judges throughout Wyoming conducted for the
purpose of the report, conﬁrmed it is an issue.36 The report indicated:
Despite current and prior efforts by the Department of Family
Services (DFS) and the Wyoming State Advisory Council on
Juvenile Justice (SACJJ) to provide direction for the state, these
bodies are not balanced by the collective vision of a statewide
body of judges who are full time juvenile law specialists or
juvenile and domestic relations law specialists.37
It also recognized “[c]oncurrent jurisdiction . . . prevents consistent policy
concerning its use, and interferes with efforts to plan for separate juvenile detention
resources, all of which contribute to overuse [of concurrent jurisdiction].”38 Among
other problems, the report concluded “[j]udicial leadership is a requisite for both
dependency and delinquency court improvement. A fractured court system that
places concurrent jurisdiction for the criminal and non-criminal behavior of
minors in three different courts presents obstacles for nurturing statewide juvenile
justice leadership among the judiciary.”39
Although not an exhaustive list of the problems found in the Act, the WYSAC
report provides an ofﬁcial study of the areas addressed in this comment including:
prosecutors’ absolute discretion, concurrent jurisdiction, the high rate of juveniles
adjudicated in adult courts, and the difference in Wyoming’s law and philosophy
to ﬁrst subject juveniles to adult courts rather than initially trying them in a
juvenile court.40

33

Id.

34

WYSAC, supra note 12, at 12.

35

Id. at 12-13.

36

Id. at 13.

37

Id.

38

Id.

39

Id.

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-201 et. seq. (Juvenile Justice Act) (2007), See also WYSAC, supra
note 12.
40
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Viewing juveniles one-dimensionally is not sufﬁcient to diagnose or treat
juvenile criminal offenders.41 Social, biological, cognitive, and psychological
factors must be considered when examining them.42 As a result, the treatment of
youth offenders is multi-dimensional.43 The centralized goal of juvenile justice
is to rehabilitate and individualize juvenile offenders.44 In theory, the Act has
that goal at heart; in reality, the majority of juvenile offenders in Wyoming are
never given the opportunity to be adjudicated in a juvenile court that treats them
multi-dimensionally.45
D.D. was tried in Natrona County where the overwhelming majority
of juveniles (ninety-seven percent) were tried in adult courts.46 As a practical
matter, over one-half of the juvenile offenses in Natrona County were trafﬁc
offenses, cases not appropriate for juvenile adjudication.47 However, there remain
a large number of offenses that are proper for juvenile adjudication. Among
these WYSAC mentioned alcohol, property, drug and other offenses.48 Further
complicating matters, Wyoming lacks a single-entry policy where children are
screened to determine the appropriate court jurisdiction.49 This comment does
not advocate that the ninety-seven percent of juveniles adjudicated in adult courts
in Natrona County required juvenile court adjudication. It also does not address
the need for a centralized screening process to determine whether adult court or
the rehabilitative approach of juvenile court is appropriate.50 Clearly some form
of single point of entry or evaluation of juveniles is needed.51 Sample discussions
of the reasons for such use can be found in the OJJDP’s Juvenile Justice Bulletin.52

41

Charles Billikas, Article: The Ideal Juvenile Rehabilitation Program: an Integrated System, 21
NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 411, 412-13 (Summer 1995).
42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Id. at 411.

45

See supra, note 31 and accompanying text.

46

Supra note 9, and accompanying text; see supra note 31.

47

WYSAC, supra note 12, at 49-50.

48

Id. at 48-50.

Id. at 14 (citing John M. Burman, Juvenile Injustice in Wyoming, 4 WYO. LAW REV. 669
(2004) and the discussion of having a single entry policy to address which juveniles need to go into
a juvenile court setting).
49

50
WYSAC, supra note 12, at 14-15. (discussing the centralized screening process and a
gatekeeper need in Wyoming). This is not the central focus of this comment, but simple trafﬁc
offenses may not need to be adjudicated in an adult court. This constitutes over one-half of the
97% of juvenile cases tried in adult courts in Natrona County. Id. However, there is still a need for a
centralized “gatekeeper or screening process to decide in which court a juvenile is adjudicated.” Id.
51
Ofﬁce of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Juvenile Justice Bulletin, Conceptual
Elements, Single Point of Entry (March 2000) available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/
jjbul2000_03_6/pag3.html.
52

Id.
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Though these matters are not the central focus of this comment, their practical
considerations should be kept in mind throughout the reading of this comment.
The four-county study conducted by WYSAC concluded the majority of
juvenile offenders in the state are indeed tried in adult courts.53 Because of the
many problems of the Act, one of which is the broad granting of concurrent
jurisdiction over juveniles, there is little opportunity for Wyoming juveniles to
assert their right to be adjudicated in a juvenile court where rehabilitation is
the key focus.54 The factors discussed in the Act emphasizing rehabilitation and
differential treatment of juveniles are not utilized when a juvenile is adjudicated
in an adult court system.55

C. Problems with Juvenile Justice in Wyoming
This comment focuses on children who have committed delinquent acts,
meaning acts that would have been crimes if committed by an adult.56 Currently,
Wyoming’s direction in regard to the juvenile justice system can be found in the
WYSAC Report. WYSAC recommended the goal of the state’s juvenile justice
system be moved from emphasizing punishment to rehabilitating children and
serving families.57 WYSAC further recognized that Wyoming is currently the only
state that has failed to comply with the JJDPA of 2002.58

1. Concurrent Jurisdiction
Ironically, Wyoming’s non-compliance is not a new issue. The state has
been non-compliant with the JJDPA since 1981.59 In fact, Wyoming holds
the “dubious distinction of being the only state not in substantial compliance
with the [JJDPA].”60 University of Wyoming College of Law Professor John M.

53

WYSAC, supra note 12, at 48. (A breakdown of the numbers in Natrona County reﬂects 97%
of Juveniles being adjudicated in adult court. The following was established in the report: municipal
court (in Casper) handled 72% of juvenile cases; circuit court presided over 23% of juvenile cases
in the City of Casper; an additional 2% of the juveniles in Natrona County were adjudicated in
municipal or circuit courts in the two small towns of Edgerton and Evansville. Further numbers by
category can be viewed on pps. 48–50.).
54

See discussion infra Part III.D.

55

See discussion infra Part III.B.

56

See Juvenile Justice Act, WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-6-201 to 252 (2007).

57

Wyoming State Advisory Council on Juvenile Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, Council
on Juvenile Justice Annual Report 2006, (2007) available at http://www.wyjuvenilejustice.com/
PDF/2006%20Annual%20report%20(2).pdf.
58

WYSAC, supra note 12, at 8–9.

Donna Sheen, Professional Responsibilities Towards Children in Trouble with the Law, 5 WYO.
L. REV. 483, 484 (2005).
59

60

Id. at 485.
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Burman previously identiﬁed many shortcomings of the Juvenile Justice Act in
Wyoming on a broad spectrum.61 The broad granting of concurrent jurisdiction
in juvenile cases is the primary problem.62 Kent v. United States addressed exclusive
jurisdiction, and stressed the right of juveniles to appear in juvenile court prior to
an appearance in adult court.63 United States v. Bilbo emphasized the necessity of
a transfer hearing prior to a juvenile being adjudicated as an adult.64
Wyoming statutes are confusing since it grants concurrent jurisdiction in all
cases except status offenses.65 A subsequent section of the statute states juvenile
courts “have exclusive jurisdiction in all cases, other than status offenses, in which
a minor who has not attained the age of thirteen (13) years is alleged to have
committed a felony or a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for more
than six (6) months.”66 Only felonies or misdemeanors punishable by more
than six months in jail are subject to exclusive juvenile jurisdiction.67 A large gap
exists between felonies and “all other cases” in allowing concurrent jurisdiction
for “all other” crimes committed by a minor.68 Concurrent jurisdiction allows
all delinquent acts except felonies to be dealt with in an adult court without the
rehabilitation available through a juvenile court.69
Black’s Law Dictionary deﬁnes concurrent jurisdiction as, “[j]urisdiction that
might be exercised simultaneously by more than one court over the same subject
matter and within the same territory, a litigant having the right to choose the court
in which to ﬁle the action.”70 Localized concurrent jurisdiction gives prosecutors,
as litigants, the ability to choose in which court a child is adjudicated.71 This
violates the JJDPA policy proscribing a sound and sealed system that allows for
the delivery of the rehabilitative goals of juvenile justice.72 This legal “loophole”
in the Act subverts the entire goal of the juvenile justice system.73

61

John M. Burman, Juvenile Injustice in Wyoming, 4 WYO. LAW REV. 669, 671-72 (2004).

62

Sheen, supra note 59, at 485.

63

Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541, 560-61 (1966).

64

U.S. v. Bilbo, 19 F.3d 912, 915-17 (5th Cir. 1994).

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-201(a) (xxiii) (2007). “Status offense means any offense which, if
committed by an adult, would not constitute an act punishable as a criminal offense by the laws of
this state or violation of a municipal ordinance . . . .” Id.
65

66

Id. § 14-6-203(d).

67

Id. § 14-6-203.

68

Id.

69

See infra notes 188-194 and accompanying text.

70

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 868 (8th ed. 2004).

71

See infra notes 161-165 and accompanying text.

72

See 42 U.S.C. 5602 et. seq. (2006).

73

Burman, supra note 61, at 669.
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2. Prosecutorial Discretion
The vast majority of juvenile cases in Wyoming, except felonies, are subject to
adjudication wherever the prosecutor or a law enforcement ofﬁcer chooses to bring
the charges.74 The Natrona County District Court and the Wyoming Supreme
Court have held prosecutorial absolute discretion constitutional.75 In 1984, the
Wyoming Supreme Court held constitutional a prosecutor’s choice whether a
juvenile should be brought as an adult in district court or addressed in juvenile
court.76 Granting decision making authority to prosecutors removes jurisdiction
from the hands of the judges and, in turn, creates numerous problems.77
Police ofﬁcers also decide in which court a juvenile appears when issuing
a citation.78 The Wyoming Supreme Court’s determination that prosecutorial
discretion is constitutional is contrary to the ideals of juvenile justice and does
not comport with the rest of the country in addressing juvenile justice.79 Case law
established by the U.S. Supreme Court indicates Wyoming’s process is contrary
to the due process and fairness afforded to juveniles.80 In re Gault requires notice
to parents prior to a hearing and further sets forth the requirements needed for
notice to satisfy due process.81

3. Confusion in Wyoming Statutes
In the words of a Wyoming District Court Judge, “Wyoming juvenile justice
statutes are confusing and disorganized in the area of children. . . . Wyoming
statutes concerning juveniles need to be clariﬁed and more options need to be
available for judges when adjudicating juveniles.”82 The joint study by WYSAC
and NCJJ also cite confusion in the Wyoming statutes.83 The report found “the
overarching problem in Wyoming [is the] lack of clear standards in statutes and
policies relating to juvenile justice issues.”84 Generalizing that all districts apply the
statutes incorrectly is erroneous because of the inconsistency and lack of guidance

74

See infra notes 161-165 and accompanying text.

75

Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d 911, 929 (Wyo. 1984).

76

Id.

77

See discussion infra Part III.E.

78

WYSAC, supra note 12, at 12.

79

See discussion infra Part III.E.

80

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1967).

81

Id. at 33-34.

82

Email from a Wyoming District Court Judge, (Mar. 1, 2007) (On ﬁle with author, Judge to
remain anonymous).
83

Burman, supra note 61, at 685.

84

Id. (citing Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems’ Responses to Youth Violence, 24
CRIME & JUST. 189, 189 (1998)).
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in the act.85 Juvenile justice is not consistently or fairly applied in Wyoming.86
The higher rational basis test articulated in Johnson v. State Hearing Examiner’s
Ofﬁce, when applied to juvenile justice statutes in Wyoming, renders the statutes
unconstitutional.87
Ironically, the Act speciﬁcally states one of its purposes is “[t]o provide a
simple judicial procedure through which the provisions of this act are executed
and enforced and in which the parties are assured a fair and timely hearing and
their constitutional and other legal rights recognized and enforced.”88 The statutes
are not simple and the contradictions within them prompt questions of whether
the Act is constitutional and fair to the juveniles in the state who are not convicted
of felonies or status offense crimes.89 The Wyoming State Advisory Council on
Juvenile Justice contends Wyoming has taken the rehabilitative stance in dealing
with juveniles.90 Wyoming does not treat the majority of juveniles consistent with
the goals of the Act according to the analysis of the court in D.D.91

D. Facts of D.D. v. City of Casper, Wyoming
On October 5, 2005, Casper police cited D.D., a sixteen-year-old male,
with petit larceny.92 The boy signed the citation and agreed to appear in court on
October 28, 2005.93 The citation stated he needed to bring a parent with him,
but D.D. ignored the ticket and missed his court date.94 On November 1, 2005,
the court issued a bench warrant for D.D.’s arrest.95 Approximately one month
later, D.D. was called out of class, placed in handcuffs, and transported to the
85
WYSAC, supra note 12, at 12-13. The WYSAC Report only focused on four counties and
there is no known statistical data on other counties in Wyoming. Id. Generalizing that all counties
are not correctly applying the Act is beyond the scope of current available statistical information.
Id.
86

WYSAC supra note 12, at 12.

87

See discussion infra Part III.F. (citing Johnson v. State Hearing Examiner’s Ofﬁce, 838 P.2d
158 (Wyo. 1992)).
88

WYO. STAT. ANN. §14-6-201(c) (iv) (2007).

89

See discussion infra Part III.C.

90

Wyoming State Advisory Council on Juvenile Justice, Annual Report to the Governor. Jan.
3, 2003. (Philosophy of juvenile court vs. criminal court: It has long been recognized (over 100
years) that there are inherent differences between adult and juvenile offenders. This is why Juvenile
Codes have been enacted in every state beginning with Illinois in 1899 and ending with Wyoming’s
juvenile code in 1945. The Wyoming Juvenile Code differs from the penal code with its emphasis
on rehabilitating the juvenile offender and his family, while holding him/her responsible and
accountable and protecting the community. . . .).
91

See infra notes 159-162 and accompanying text.

92

D.D. v. City of Casper, Wyo., Seventh Judicial Dist. Criminal Action No. 16885-A, 2 (Dec.
4, 2005).
93

Id.

94

Id.

95

Id.
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Natrona County Juvenile Detention Center.96 He was treated with lice killer and
placed in jail clothing.97 After an indeterminate period of time D.D. was released
to his father.98 Ultimately the City of Casper Municipal Court found D.D. guilty
of stealing a key worth less than $20 dollars and ordered him to pay $160 in ﬁnes
or perform thirty-two hours of community service.99 D.D.’s parents were not
notiﬁed of the ticket until after D.D. was arrested and processed at the Juvenile
Detention Center.100 On appeal, D.D. raised inter alia, the questions of whether
or not his arrest fell within the Wyoming Juvenile Justice statutory structure,
whether his arrest was constitutional for him or his parents, and whether all of
his due process rights were correctly applied.101 On appeal, the Natrona County
District Court ruled the arrest constitutional and valid.102

III. THE ANALYSIS
A. The Right and Duty of a Parent to Appear with Their Child in a Juvenile
Delinquency Proceeding
D.D.’s parents were not made aware of his citation, an issue of legitimate
concern. Wyoming Statute § 14-2-205(a) states it is the responsibility of “one (1)
or both parents [to appear when] the minor is required to appear and is alleged to
have committed a criminal offense or to have violated a municipal ordinance.”103
Parents have the opportunity to address the court.104 If a parent fails to appear
when served with an order, he or she may be held in contempt.105 Parents may
also be liable for property damage committed by their child.106 More pointedly,
the deﬁnition section of the Act deﬁnes parties to include “the child, his parents,
guardian or custodian, the state of Wyoming and any other person made a party
by an order to appear, or named by the juvenile court.”107 Because D.D’s case was
in municipal court and not juvenile court, the Natrona County District Court

96

Brief of Appellant at 7, D.D. v. City of Casper, Wyo., Seventh Judicial District Criminal
Action No. 16885-A (Dec. 4, 2005).
97

Id.

98

Id.

99

Anthony Lane, A Missing Key, CASPER STAR TRIBUNE, Aug. 28, 2006, at A1 and A11.

100

Id.

101

D.D. v. City of Casper, Wyo., Seventh Judicial District Criminal Action No. 16885-A, 1
(Dec. 4, 2005).
102

Id.

103

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-205(a) (2007).

104

Id.

105

Id. at §14-2-205(c), (d).

106

Id. at § 14-2-203.

107

Id. at § 14-6-201(a)(xviii).
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held the juvenile justice statutes did not apply.108 Had D.D. been adjudicated
in juvenile court, the position this comment supports, his parents would have
been required parties and their presence would have been mandatory under the
Act.109
Parents are unable to perform their statutory duties to appear with their child
if they are not notiﬁed of a citation.110 The district court in D.D. dismissed this
argument on the basis that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-205(c) does not require parents
to appear in municipal courts.111 Further, D.D. “provides no authority for the
proposition that the parents of a child who is suspected of criminal or delinquent
conduct must be notiﬁed of an investigation into this conduct.”112 However, these
assertions do not align with a juvenile’s right to be subjected to a juvenile court, or
a parent’s rights and duties according to the deﬁnitions and ideals of the Act.113
In re Gault speciﬁcally addressed parents’ rights to be made aware of an
initial hearing or notiﬁcation that their child is to be taken into custody, and
held notice given at an initial hearing is not timely.114 The U.S. Supreme Court
further addressed the issue of notiﬁcation to parents stating, “Notice, to comply
with due process requirements, must be given sufﬁciently in advance of scheduled
court proceedings so that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded,
and it must ‘set forth the alleged misconduct with particularity.’”115 The Court
analyzed timeliness of notice to a juvenile’s parents as a requirement that must
be met particularly when a “youth’s freedom and his parents’ right to his custody
are at stake. . . .”116 D.D.’s freedom became an issue when he was taken into
custody.117
The Natrona County District Court dismissed any argument about
notiﬁcation of pending charges against a juvenile by a municipal court “[s]ince
there is no indication that the ofﬁcer knew who the parents were or where they
lived, this was the best [the ofﬁcer] could do.”118 The court further explained that
108

D.D. v. City of Casper, Wyo., Seventh Judicial District Criminal Action No. 16885-A, 1
(Dec. 4, 2005).
109

Id.

110

WYO. STAT. ANN. §14-2-205 (2007).

111

D.D., Criminal Action No. 16885-A at 7.

112

Id. at 8.

113

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-201(c) et. seq. (2007).

114

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1967).

115

Id. at 34.

116

Id.

117

Brief of Appellant at 7, D.D. v. City of Casper, Wyo., Seventh Judicial District Criminal
Action No. 16885-A (Dec. 4, 2005).
118

D.D. v. City of Casper, Wyo., Seventh Judicial District Criminal Action No. 16885-A, 7
(Dec. 4, 2005).
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the ofﬁcer satisﬁed any notice requirement when “the ofﬁcer issuing the citation
attempted to notify the parents when he noted on the citation that [D.D.] must
appear with one parent.”119 This is directly contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court’s
holding in In re Gault.120 In re Gault stated:
Notice at [an initial hearing on the merits] is not timely; and even
if there were a conceivable purpose served by the deferral proposed
by the court below, it would have to yield to the requirements
that the child and his parents or guardian be notiﬁed, in writing,
of the speciﬁc charge or factual allegations to be considered at
the hearing, and that such written notice be given at the earliest
practicable time, and in any event sufﬁciently in advance of the
hearing to permit preparation.121
The requirement of notice in In re Gault is notice be given prior to a hearing.122
D.D.’s parents never received proper notice.123 The Natrona County District
Court in D.D. found notiﬁcation of the parents after incarceration sufﬁcient,
and that he was only incarcerated for a few hours.124 Adequate notice to satisfy
due process requirements as described in In re Gault was not afforded D.D.’s
parents.125
Further due process rights of notice to a juvenile’s parents were examined
in the Mississippi case Sharpe, a Minor, et al. v. State.126 This case addressed
due process rights and held that although a warrant may be issued, the parents
should be notiﬁed.127 Keeping in mind the limitations of comparing Wyoming
State Statutes with those of another state, Sharpe provides a good example of how
juveniles should be handled in accordance with the principles of notice set forth
in In re Gault. Sharpe stated:
Usually a summons is issued to the child. Most statutes provide
also for a summons or notice to the parent or other custodian,
requiring him to produce the child before the court at a time

119

Id.

120

In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 34.

121

Id. (emphasis added).

122

Id.

123

See Lane, supra note 100.

124

D.D. v. City of Casper, Wyo., Seventh Judicial District Criminal Action No. 16885-A, 7-8
(Dec. 4, 2005).
125

In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 34 (discussing the application of due process as a requirement of
adequate notice in a criminal context) (internal citations omitted).
126

Sharpe, a Minor, et al. v. State, 127 So. 2d 865 (Miss. 1961).

127

Id. at 870.
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speciﬁed therein. In some instances a warrant may be issued for
the purpose of securing the child’s presence before the court.128
The Act is not explicit about notice to parents. It merely states that any person
taking a child into custody shall, “as soon as possible notify the child’s parent,
guardian or custodian.”129 In the case of D.D., notice could have been given
well in advance of a bench warrant and arrest. The Act does not align with the
constitutional due process right of notice for a parent discussed in In re Gault.130

B. The Right of a Juvenile to be in Juvenile Court
According to the Natrona County District Court’s decision letter in D.D., no
presumed elevated Constitutional right for a juvenile to be adjudicated in juvenile
court exists.131 The “challenged statute is presumed constitutional and appellant
carries the heavy burden of proving [it] unconstitutional by clear and exact proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.”132
United States v. Bilbo addressed the origin of a juvenile action.133 A juvenile
action should not begin in adult court, but in juvenile court.134 The process by
which a juvenile encounters an adult court is through transfer, and although not
binding on Wyoming courts, Bilbo supported the transfer of a minor to an adult
court so long as the decision for such a transfer is tempered in a way that affords a
juvenile justice system to exist.135 Wyoming’s Juvenile Justice System exists in statute,
but no separate court deals solely with juveniles.
In Bilbo, the Texas Appellate Court found the guidelines for a juvenile to be
transferred to an adult court were met.136 Bilbo dealt with a federal jurisdictional
matter so the factors of 18 U.S.C. §5032 were used in determining whether the
juvenile should have been transferred.137 The Bilbo court also acknowledged the
128

Id. at 869 (emphasis added).

129

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-206 (b) (2007).

130
Compare supra note 124 with supra notes 120-122 and accompanying text (showing that
the district court found notice to D.D. constitutional, but In re Gault has set an expectation for
notice).
131
D.D. v. City of Casper, Wyo., Seventh Judicial District Criminal Action No. 16885-A, 12
(Dec. 4, 2005).
132

Id. at 4.

133

U.S. v. Bilbo, 19 F.3d 912, 915 (5th Cir. 1994).

134

Id.

135

Id. at 916 (emphasis added).

136

Id.

137

Id. at 913. The factors considered were: the age and social background of the juvenile; the
nature of the alleged offense; the extent and nature of the juvenile’s prior delinquency record; the
juvenile’s present intellectual development and psychological maturity; the nature of past treatment
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decision to transfer a juvenile to trial as an adult, at least on the federal level,
was within the sound discretion of the trial court.138 In Wyoming, the decision
is not made by a judge or a trial court in reference to misdemeanors and status
offenses, but by a prosecutor or the police ofﬁcer issuing a ticket.139 There is no
standard guiding a prosecutor’s decision about the court in which to adjudicate a
juvenile.140
The D.D. decision contends the Act does not apply, and all cases do not
need to be issued from a juvenile court since this would be contrary to “the plain
provisions of the statutes allowing concurrent jurisdiction.”141 The interpretation
is a juvenile over the age of twelve has no right to be treated as a juvenile at any
time, and that concurrent jurisdiction allows a prosecutor to decide whether a
juvenile should be submitted to juvenile jurisdiction where rehabilitation is the
key or charged as an adult contrary to the goals of the Act.142

C. The Right of Juveniles to Due Process
The right to due process is a fundamental right under the U.S. Constitution
where “[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”143 Accordingly,
a child in juvenile court should be afforded certain rights collectively called due
process rights.144 The law is unclear on whether due process should extend to a
child in a juvenile court, or whether being subject to adult courts satisﬁes due
process protections, but Kent held that certain due process rights should be
afforded to juveniles.145 The Supreme Court in Kent stated a Juvenile Court Act:
[C]onfers upon the child a right to avail himself of that court’s
‘exclusive’ jurisdiction. As the court of appeals has said, ‘[I]t
is implicit in [the Juvenile Court] scheme that non-criminal
efforts and the juvenile’s response to such efforts; [and] the availability of programs designed to treat
the juvenile’s behavioral problems. Id.
138

Id. at 915.

139

See discussion infra Part III.E.

140

Id.

141

D.D. v. City of Casper, Wyo., Seventh Judicial District Criminal Action No. 16885-A, 7
(Dec. 4, 2005).
142

Id. at 4 (citing Misenheimer v. State, P.3d 273, 276 (Wyo. 2001)).

143

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.

144

National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges (NCJFCJ), Juvenile Delinquency
Guidelines; Improving Court Practice in Juvenile Delinquency Cases, at 12 (Spring 2005) (referring
to In re Gault).
145

Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541, 560-61 (1966).
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treatment is to be the rule—and the adult criminal treatment,
the exception which must be governed by the particular factors
of individual cases.146
Kent addressed exclusive jurisdiction of a juvenile court rather than concurrent
jurisdiction; however, it stressed that juveniles should have an opportunity to ﬁrst
be subjected to the jurisdiction of juvenile court systems.147 The opposite is true
in Wyoming.148 More frequently a juvenile begins and ends in an adult court,
with the minority of cases originating in juvenile courts.149 In Wyoming, the goal
of the Act is consistent with the ruling in Kent.150 The Wyoming Juvenile Justice
Act states in pertinent part:
(c) This act shall be construed to effectuate the following public
purposes:
(i) To provide for the best interests of the child and the protection
of the public and public safety;
(ii) Consistent with the best interests of the child and the
protection of the public and public safety:
(A) To promote the concept of punishment for criminal acts
while recognizing and distinguishing the behavior of children
who have been victimized or have disabilities, such as serious
mental illness that requires treatment or children with a cognitive
impairment that requires services;
(B) To remove, where appropriate, the taint of criminality from
children committing certain unlawful acts; and
(C) To provide treatment, training and rehabilitation that
emphasizes the accountability and responsibility of both the
parent and the child for the child’s conduct, reduces recidivism
and helps children to become functioning and contributing
adults.

146

Id. (citing Harling v. U.S, 295 F.2d 161, 164-65 (1961)).

147

Id.

148

See discussion supra Part III.B.

149

Id.

Compare Kent, 383 U.S. at 560-61, with WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-201(c)(vi) (2007) (the
goal of the Act is consistent with the decision in Kent that adult court should be the minority and
that a minor should be afforded the right to juvenile court ﬁrst).
150
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(iii) To provide for the care, the protection and the wholesome
moral, mental and physical development of children within the
community whenever possible using the least restrictive and
most appropriate interventions;
(iv) To be ﬂexible and innovative and encourage coordination at
the community level to reduce the commission of unlawful acts
by children;
(v) To achieve the foregoing purposes in a family environment
whenever possible, separating the child from the child’s parents
only when necessary for the child’s welfare or in the interest
of public safety and when a child is removed from the child’s
family, to ensure that individual needs will control placement
and provide the child the care that should be provided by
parents; and
(vi) To provide a simple judicial procedure through which the
provisions of this act are executed and enforced and in which
the parties are assured a fair and timely hearing and their
constitutional and other legal rights recognized and enforced.151
Wyoming Statute Annotated § 14-16-201 (c)(ii)(A) would have applied in
D.D. in a juvenile court, but the municipal court never examined these factors.152
Wyoming Statute Annotated § 14-16-201 (c)(ii)(C) of the Act would also have
been applicable had the information regarding D.D.’s background been heard by
the court.153 Treatment or rehabilitation may have been more effective than a ﬁne
and community service. The adult court in which D.D. was tried used a punitive
remedy rather than a rehabilitative approach.154
The next portion of the statute stresses care should be provided with the least
restrictive and most appropriate interventions.155 While D.D.’s outcome may not
have been restrictive, the various factors delineated for consideration in the Act
were not measured in determining the most appropriate intervention since D.D.
was never given the opportunity to go through a juvenile court proceeding.156
Flexibility and innovation are encouraged in dealing with juveniles to reduce the
151

WYO. STAT. ANN. §14-6-201 (2007).

152

D.D. v. City of Casper, Wyo., Seventh Judicial District Criminal Action No. 16885-A, 8
(Dec. 4, 2005).
153

Id. The district court found D.D.’s personal history to be of questionable relevance. Id.

154

Id. at 11. The district court found that minor crimes were not worthy of Juvenile Court
Adjudication. Id.
155

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-201 (c) (iii) (2007).

156

D.D., Criminal Action No. 16885-A at 2.
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commission of unlawful acts by children.157 A ﬁne and community service is neither
ﬂexible nor innovative. Had D.D. struggled with learning disabilities, behavioral
impairments, or other problems, the problems could have been addressed as part of
the rehabilitative process in a juvenile court.158 The Act recognizes these factors as
important when dealing with juvenile delinquency cases.159 The Natrona County
District Court disregarded them by stating that D.D.’s personal history was of
questionable relevance, was not part of the record, and would not be considered
in the appellate decision.160
The goals of the Act are effectively undercut by the broad granting of
concurrent jurisdiction as the majority of juveniles in many Wyoming counties
are never given the opportunity to be subject to the Juvenile Justice Act statutes.161
Wyoming effectively makes juvenile justice the exception and adult criminal
treatment the rule.162 Case law nationwide does not stop here, however, as there is
further support that the Act be viewed as a priority for minors, and adult criminal
justice systems as the secondary venue for juvenile offenders.163 Closer to home,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the importance of a juvenile’s right
to be adjudicated in a juvenile court and how critical the decision to permit adult
prosecution of a juvenile.164 The Tenth Circuit pointed to the authority of juvenile
courts, not the prosecutor, in transferring or certifying a case involving a juvenile
to adult courts.165 In Kelley v. Kaiser, the Tenth Circuit found the conviction of
a juvenile tried in an adult court need not be set aside if the juvenile would have
ended up in adult court anyway.166
Additional case law stresses the importance of treating juvenile and adult
court proceedings differently.167 “These strict safeguards, however, are wholly
inappropriate for the ﬂexible and informal procedures of the Juvenile Court
which are essential to its parens patriae function.”168 “To avoid impairment of this
157

WYO. STAT. ANN. §14-6-201(c)(iv) (2007).

158

Id. at § 14-6-20-201(c)(ii)(A) .

159

Id.

160

D.D., Criminal Action No. 16885-A at 8.

161

See WYSAC, supra note 12, at 12.

162

Id.

163

See Kent, 383 U.S. at 560-61; Green v. Reynolds, 57 F.3d 956, 960 (10th Cir. 1995); Kelley
v. Kaiser, 992 F.2d 1509, 1511 (10th Cir. 1993).
164

Green, 57 F.3d at 960.

165

Kelley, 992 F.2d at 1511.

166

Id.

167

Harling v. U.S., 295 F.2d 161, 164 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (citing U.S. v. Dickerson, 271 F.2d
487, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1959)). See also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 868 (8th ed. 2004) (deﬁnition of
parens patriae, “The state regarded as a sovereign; the state in its capacity as provider of protection
to those unable to care for themselves.”).
168

Harling, 295 F.2d at 164.
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function, the juvenile proceeding must be insulated from the adult proceeding.”169
Wyoming does not insulate the majority of juvenile delinquents from adult
proceedings; rather it freely exposes juveniles to adult courts.170 The key to ensure
juveniles a right to juvenile proceedings is to have them begin in juvenile court.171
Juveniles should have the right to juvenile adjudication unless transferred by a
judge for adjudication in an adult court.172
Though Wyoming stresses the importance of treating juveniles differently,
there is no certainty a juvenile will have the opportunity to enter a juvenile court
system because of concurrent jurisdiction.173 The authority of the prosecuting
attorney to decide in which court a juvenile should be tried was held constitutional
by the Wyoming Supreme Court in 1984.174 This holding undercuts the goals of
rehabilitation set out in the Act.175 Very few juvenile delinquency cases are ever
brought before a juvenile court.176 The statute states:
No court other than the district court shall order the transfer of a
case to juvenile court. At any time after a proceeding over which
the juvenile court has concurrent jurisdiction is commenced in
municipal or circuit court, the judge of the court in which the
proceeding is commenced may on the court’s own motion, or on
the motion of any party, suspend further proceedings and refer
the case to the ofﬁce of the district attorney to determine whether
a petition should be ﬁled in the juvenile court to commence a
proceeding under this act. If a petition is ﬁled under this act,
the original proceeding commenced in the municipal or circuit
court shall be dismissed. If the district attorney determines not to
ﬁle a petition under this act, the district attorney shall immediately
notify the municipal or circuit court and the proceeding commenced
in that court may continue.177
Authority for venue in Wyoming is ultimately up to the district attorney or
a law enforcement ofﬁcer issuing a ticket, and there is no authority for a judge to
transfer a case from their adult court into a juvenile court unless the prosecuting

169

Id. (citing U.S. v. Dickerson, 271 F.2d 487, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1959)).

170

WYSAC, supra notes 12, at 12.

171

Kent, 383 U.S. 541, 560-61 (1966).

172

See generally WYSAC, supra note 12.

173

See discussion Part III.C.

174

Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d 911, 929 (Wyo. 1984).

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-201 et. seq. (2007) (the juvenile justice act and the goals set out
in the statute).
175

176

See WYSAC, supra note 12, at 11-12 and accompanying text.

177

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-237(h) (2007) (emphasis added).
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attorney is willing to ﬁle a petition under the Act.178 A motion can be made, but
the ultimate decision rests with the district attorney.179 Statistically, this procedure
rarely occurs in Wyoming, and the majority of all juvenile delinquent cases are
heard in courts other than juvenile court.180
The Natrona County District Court in D.D. stated the statute must be viewed
in favor of constitutionality, and a statute violates equal protection if it encourages
arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions.181 The court’s standard of review
was, “where a statute or a governmental action affects a fundamental interest
. . . [t]he court uses a strict scrutiny test to determine if statute or governmental
action is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.”182 Juveniles should have
a fundamental interest and right to be subject to juvenile court systems.183 The
law is silent on this issue so far as juvenile justice is concerned; however, the
analysis above establishes that the right to juvenile adjudication is more than just
an ordinary interest or right.184
A juvenile’s right to due process was set forth by the U.S. Supreme
Court in In re Gault:
[W]ith respect to such waiver proceedings that while ‘We do not
mean . . . to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform
with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the
usual administrative hearing; but we do hold that the hearing
must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.’
We reiterate this view, here in connection with a juvenile court
adjudication of ‘delinquency,’ as a requirement which is part of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of our
Constitution.185
The most elementary deﬁnition of due process can be found in Black’s Law
Dictionary: “The conduct of legal proceedings according to established rules and
principles for the protection and enforcement of private rights, including notice
and the right to a fair hearing before a tribunal with the power to decide the

178

Id.

179

Id.

180

WYSAC, supra note 12, at 12.

181

D.D. v. City of Casper, Wyo., Seventh Judicial District Criminal Action No. 16885-A, 4
(Dec. 4, 2005) (citing Moe v. State, 110 P.3d 1206, 1210 (Wyo. 2005)).
182
D.D., Criminal Action No. 16885-A, at 4 (citing Misenheimer v. State, 27 P.3d 273, 276
(Wyo. 2001)).
183

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1967).

184

Id. at 30.

185

Id. (emphasis added).
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case.”186 United States case law requires juveniles have a right to juvenile courts to
be assured their right to due process.187 Wyoming case law is silent on this issue.

D. Concurrent Jurisdiction is Unconstitutional
It is unconstitutional for the Act to grant concurrent jurisdiction.188 The
Wyoming Juvenile Justice statute plainly state, “[e]xcept as provided in subsection
(d) of this section, the juvenile court has concurrent jurisdiction in all cases, other
than status offenses, in which a minor is alleged to have committed a criminal
offense or to have violated a municipal ordinance.”189 The exception to concurrent
jurisdiction is, “[t]he juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction in all cases, other
than status offenses, in which a minor who has not attained the age of thirteen
(13) years is alleged to have committed a felony or a misdemeanor punishable by
imprisonment for more than six (6) months.”190
Wyoming Juvenile Justice Statutes are inconsistent and confusing.191
Immediately following the sections granting juvenile courts exclusive jurisdiction
over juveniles charged with a felony or misdemeanor punishable by up to six
months in jail or those juveniles under the age of thirteen, the Act allows any
other actions to be originally commenced in a non-juvenile court in spite of the
fact a juvenile is involved in the proceedings.192 Although consistent with the
idea of statutory concurrent jurisdiction, granting concurrent jurisdiction is not
consistent with the goal of the Act.193 When the majority of juveniles are tried in
adult courts rather than under the juvenile justice statutes, concurrent jurisdiction
is self-defeating since the majority of juveniles are not afforded the right to be
treated as juveniles in the eyes of the court.194
In D.D., the Natrona County District Court erred by deciding the Juvenile
Justice Act “allows detention to occur upon the issuance of any court order, and it

186

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 868 (8th ed. 2004).

187

Infra note 252 (discussing the Wyoming rational basis test and the constitutionality of
Wyoming’s Juvenile Justice Act). See generally Johnson v. State Hearing Examiner’s Ofﬁce, 838 P.2d
158 (Wyo. 1992).
188

Johnson, 838 P.2d at 160-61.

189

WYO. STAT. ANN. §14-6-203(c) (2007).

190

Id. at §14-6-203(d).

191

Id. at §§ 14-6-203(c)-(f ).

192

Id. at §§ 14-6-203 (e),(f ).

193

The goal of the Act is “to provide treatment, training and rehabilitation that emphasizes the
accountability and responsibility of both the parent and the child for the child’s conduct, reduces
recidivism and helps children to become functioning and contributing adults.” WYO. STAT. ANN. §
14-6-201(c)(ii)(C) (2007) (emphasis added).
194

See discussion supra Part III.D.
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is not restricted to an order issued from juvenile court.”195 Further error occurred
when the Natrona County District Court concluded the plain reading of the
statute results in concluding the word “‘court’ is an adjective modifying the word
‘order.’”196 The Natrona County District Court ruled that if the court accepted
the argument of the appellant, a juvenile could not be taken into custody without
an order from a juvenile court, and “[e]ither an inferior court would have no
means to compel attendance of a minor who was accused of a misdemeanor or all
cases would have to be processed through juvenile court. The latter is contrary to
the plain provisions of the statute allowing concurrent jurisdiction. . . . ”197 This
statement is misleading. The juvenile justice system should be the primary court
to deal with juveniles, and the adult court should be the exception.198
Further, the Natrona County District Court misinterpreted the Act’s
deﬁnition of “court.” Appellant’s Brief argued the Act’s deﬁnition of the word
“court” meant, “the juvenile court established by Wyo. Stat. § 5-8-101.”199 To
adopt the plain meaning of a statute without viewing the statute in its entirety and
taking judicial notice of the deﬁnition of the word “court” as prescribed by statute
is erroneous.200 The statute contradicts itself by allowing concurrent jurisdiction
and then deﬁning the word “court” to mean juvenile court.201 A child cannot be
detained without a court order, but the statute does not specify which court.202
The Act deﬁnes court as the juvenile court, but the district court interpreted the
word court to mean any court.203 The district court was in error when it ruled
contrary to this deﬁnition.204
The Tenth Circuit has reinforced the idea that transferring a juvenile
from juvenile court to adult court is an extremely important decision, and any
such transfer should not be taken lightly.205 The Tenth Circuit emphasized
the importance of the transfer process when it stated, “there is no place in our
system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous consequences without

195

D.D. v. City of Casper, Wyo., Seventh Judicial District Criminal Action No. 16885-A, 7
(Dec. 4, 2005) (emphasis supplied).
196

Id.

197

Id.

198

Kent, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-201(a)(vii) (2007). See also Brief of Appellant at 7, D.D. v. City of
Casper, Wyo., No. 16885-A (Wyo. 7th Jud. Dist. Ct. Dec. 4, 2006).
199

200

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-201 et. seq. ( 2007).

201

See id.

202

Id.

203

D.D., Criminal Action No. 16885-A at 7.

204

Compare id. with the deﬁnition of “court” under WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-201(a)(vii)

(2007).
205

Green v. Reynolds, 57 F.3d 956, 960 (10th Cir. 1995).
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ceremony—without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a
statement of reasons.”206 Yet Wyoming’s current system does not allow juveniles
the opportunity to ﬁrst go before a juvenile court because of concurrent
jurisdiction.207 Wyoming’s concurrent jurisdiction is counter-intuitive to the
ideals set forth in the Act and the law established in the Tenth Circuit and the
U.S. Supreme Court.208
The U.S. Supreme Court held in In re Gault that juveniles in hearings must
be afforded due process and fair treatment.209 However, Wyoming, through
concurrent jurisdiction, allows a prosecutor or police ofﬁcer to make the decision
of where a juvenile is adjudicated.210 There is no check on the decision-making
authority of the prosecutor.211
More disturbing in the case of D.D., the citation issued by a police ofﬁcer
determined the court in which he was subjected.212 There was never an opportunity
for him to be adjudicated in a juvenile court.213 Had the decision been up to a
judge, judicial review would have provided a safeguard to the decision-making
process.214 To allow a prosecutor or law enforcement ofﬁcer to decide in which
court a juvenile is adjudicated undercuts the idea of fair treatment of juveniles set
forth by the U.S. Supreme Court.215
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that prior to a transfer to an adult court a
juvenile “must be granted a hearing which satisﬁes due process standards.”216 The
Natrona County Municipal Court violated D.D.’s due process rights when no
hearing was held to determine whether he should have been tried as a juvenile
or an adult.217 On appeal, the Natrona County District Court found D.D. was
206

Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).

207

See discussion supra Part III.D.

208

Contrast Kent, 383 U.S. at 556 (the rights of a child to avail himself to a juvenile courts
exclusive jurisdiction), Green, 57 F.3d at 960 (citing Kent, 383 U.S. at 554) and
WYO. STAT. ANN. §14-6-201 (2007) (the goals of the Act) with discussion infra Part III.F.
209

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).

210

See discussion Infra Part III.E.

211

See discussion Infra Part III.E.

212

D.D. v. City of Casper, Wyo., Seventh Judicial District Criminal Action No. 16885-A, 2
(Dec. 4, 2005).
213

Supra notes 92-102 and accompanying text (note at no time were juvenile court actions
instituted).
214

See discussion infra part III.E.

215

See generally, Maggie Krell, VIEWPOINTS ON PROPOSITION 21: Think Before You
Transfer: An Assessment of the Automatic Transfer of Juveniles to the Criminal Court, 5 UC DAVIS J.
JUV. L. & POL’Y 39 (2000) (citing Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541 (1966) and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967)).
216

In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41(emphasis supplied).

217

See discussion supra Part III.D.
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granted all due process rights guaranteed him under both the Wyoming and
U.S. Constitutions.218 Additionally, “[t]he Court [found] Gault inapposite.”219
Wyoming does not allow the U.S. Supreme Court to reign.220 The Act in Wyoming
has not evolved to a point that it can stand up to U.S. Supreme Court due process
scrutiny as there is no such hearing to certify many juveniles, and no requirement
that a prosecutor justify the reasons for bringing a case involving a juvenile into
municipal, circuit, or even district court.221
Kent and Gault are cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled on
juveniles and due process.222 As a result, the cases should be applicable to a juvenile
in a court system and are dispositive in determining whether or not due process
has been preserved.223
Wyoming is different than many states in that the juvenile justice system
has undergone few changes in the last quarter of a century.224 This is illustrated
by the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled on the transfer of juveniles,
yet Wyoming continues to allow concurrent jurisdiction in many cases.225 Even
though there are many options in juvenile courts to focus on rehabilitation,
Wyoming does not have the statutory framework to allow the juvenile justice
system to function so that the tremendous consequence of being transferred can
be considered.226
Little case law exists on municipal or circuit court juvenile misdemeanor
appeals in Wyoming. At the risk of introducing logic, the reason juvenile justice
has never risen to the attention of the Wyoming Supreme Court or the legislature
may be that paying a $160 dollar ticket is certainly cheaper than hiring an attorney
to conduct an appeal. By remaining under the judicial radar, and without judicial
activism and legislative action, this problem will not be addressed. Wyoming is
behind every other state so far as juvenile justice is concerned, and will continue
to stay that way as long as the majority of lawmakers and the judiciary are
218
D.D. v. City of Casper, Wyo., Seventh Judicial District Criminal Action No. 16885-A, 1
(Dec. 4, 2005).
219

Id. at 8–9.

Compare D.D., Criminal Action No. 16885-A at 8-9 with WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-201
Et. seq. (2007).
220

221

See discussion supra Part III.D.

222

Id.

223

Id.

224

Burman, supra note 61, at 671-72 (citing Edward J. Latessa et al., Beyond Correctional
Quackery-Professionalism and the Possibility of Effective Treatment, 66 SEP. FED. PROB. 43, 44
(September 2002) (describing changes in juvenile justice system being implemented)).
225

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-203(d) (2006).

226

No separate juvenile court exists in Wyoming which is just devoted to juvenile matters in
Wyoming, rather adult district courts transform into juvenile courts when the need arises.
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content to fall short of national expectations.227 The articulated goal of the Act,
that rehabilitation should be of utmost importance, is correct.228 Yet as long as
concurrent jurisdiction is statutorily allowed, the goal will never be met.

E. Unconstitutionality of Prosecutors’ Absolute Discretion Concerning
Juveniles and Law Enforcement Ofﬁcers’ Role in Determining Juveniles’
Court of Adjudication
A prosecutor is a member of the executive branch of government while
also serving as an ofﬁcer of the court.229 As a member of the executive branch,
prosecutors have the authority to decide whether or not to ﬁle charges and
prosecute a case.230 Wyoming’s system has expanded the prosecutor’s choice of
whether or not to prosecute a crime to include deciding where a juvenile should
be adjudicated.231 This unchecked power to determine in which court a juvenile
should be adjudicated prohibits access to the opportunities afforded in juvenile
court.232 A prosecutor need not justify why a juvenile is subjected to adult court
and there is no ceremony for a transfer from juvenile court to adult court because
a transfer is not required.
The Wyoming Constitution provides for separation of powers.233 The
Wyoming Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of prosecutor discretion to
decide in which court a juvenile should be adjudicated in 1984.234 This provision
goes against the due process ideals of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Kent.235 In fact, the determination should be made by a judge and the legislature
should mandate this change in Wyoming statutes.236 A prosecutor’s role as part of
the executive branch is to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”237 The
execution of the law is very different than determining in which court a juvenile
matter should be heard.238 It remains the obligation of the court to assure due
227

Sheen, supra note 59, at 484-85.

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-201 (c)(ii)(C) (2007) (“to provide treatment, training, rehabilitation . . .”)
228

229
Petition of Padget, 678 P.2d 870, 871 (Wyo. 1984) (citing People v. Dist. Court in and for
County of Larimer, 527 P.2d 50, 52 (1974)).
230
Petition of Padget, 678 P.2d 870, 871 (Wyo. 1984) (citing People v. Dist. Court in and for
County of Larimer, 527 P.2d 50, 52 (1974)).
231

See discussion supra Part III.E.

232

WYSAC, supra note 12, at 13.

233

WYO. CONST. Art. 2, § 1.

234

Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d 911, 929 (Wyo. 1984).

235

See supra notes 163-176 and accompanying text.

236

See discussion supra Part III.E.

Petition of Padget, 678 P.2d at 871 (citing WYO. CONST. Art. 4, §4) (addressing the duties
of the executive branch).
237

238

Contrast id. with infra notes 242-246 and accompanying text.
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process of law and the constitution are upheld.239 The Wyoming Constitution
states the Supreme Court shall have “general superintending control over all
inferior courts, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by law.”240
Accordingly, the Wyoming Supreme Court has a duty to protect the integrity
of the various courts and prohibit dealing lightly with proceedings in the lower
courts.241
The Wyoming Supreme Court has the liberty to decide a case where the
ends of justice require scrutiny on a right as fundamental as constitutional due
process.242 It must also recognize a constitutional right to due process.243 For
justice to be served, juveniles should be entitled to a transfer hearing consistent
with due process and fairness.244 Yet, this power over the court system in choosing
the jurisdiction of juveniles as articulated in the Wyoming Constitution is handed
to the executive branch by the legislature.245 The legislature laid out an intricate
system for addressing juvenile delinquency with a focus of establishing a juvenile
court that is geared toward rehabilitation.246 The only opportunity for a juvenile
over the age of twelve charged with a misdemeanor to go through juvenile court
is if a prosecutor, a member of the executive branch, chooses to ﬁle a petition
there.247 When an ofﬁcer issues a citation to a minor, this determination is made
by a law enforcement ofﬁcer and no opportunity exists to be adjudicated in a
juvenile court.248

F. A Non-Reviewable System and the Wyoming Rational Basis Test
In D.D., the Natrona County District Court applied the federal rational basis
standard in establishing that juvenile justice statutes are constitutional and do
not violate equal protection.249 However, more pertinent authority is found in
Wyoming case law in Johnson v. State Hearing Examiner’s Ofﬁce. Johnson discussed
the constitutionality of alcohol offenses and the ability of the legislature to pass laws
taking away the drivers’ licenses of minors when they are caught with alcohol.250
239

Petition of Padget, 678 P.2d 870, 871 (Wyo. 1984).

240

WYO. CONST. Art. 5, § 2.

241

Allen v. Allen, 550 P.2d 1137, 1142 (Wyo. 1976).

242

Id.

243

Id.

244

Green v. Reynolds, 57 F.3d 956, 960-61(10th Cir. 1995).

245

WYO. CONST. Art. 5, § 29.

246

WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-4-201 et. Seq. (2007).

247

Id. at §§ 16-4-201 to -252 (2007).

248

See for example the citation issued to D.D. as addressed supra note 92 (citing D.D. with
petit larceny).
249
D.D. v. City of Casper, Wyo., Seventh Judicial District Criminal Action No. 16885-A, 11
(Dec. 4, 2005).
250

Johnson v. State Hearing Examiner’s Ofﬁce, 838 P.2d 158 (Wyo. 1992).
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It held a higher scrutiny level than the federal rational basis standard should
be applied when examining due process for juveniles.251 In Johnson, the court
ﬁrst recognized that the Wyoming statute divided juveniles into three separate
groups for purposes of punishment.252 Similarly, the Act also divides juveniles
into separate groups when determining which court has what type of jurisdiction
in a delinquency case.253 The Wyoming Rational Basis Test established in Johnson
should have been the authority to which the Natrona County District Court
looked in making its determination in D.D.254
The Act grants protection to all juveniles convicted of a felony or misdemeanor
if they are under the age of thirteen, yet other juveniles are not afforded the same
equality.255 In Johnson, the court found the age differences of juveniles indicating
separate treatment could be held to constitutional scrutiny in light of Wyoming’s
Constitution.256 In D.D., the Natrona County District Court stated children are
all similarly situated within the context of Wyo. Stat. § 14-3-105 because they fall
within the deﬁnition of child.257 However, the Natrona County District Court
also found enough differences in the way the statute treated juveniles to require
a constitutional analysis of the level of scrutiny to determine if there was unequal

251
Id. The Wyoming Rational Basis Test established in Johnson allows a higher level of scrutiny
than that required by the federal constitution. It effectively puts a higher burden on constitutional
scrutiny than that of Federal rational basis, and allows for a stricter scrutiny when there is a class of
people that are being discriminated against. In effect The Wyoming Rational Base test allows strict
scrutiny of constitutional rights when there is a legislatively deﬁned class that may not ﬁt within
the deﬁnition for a suspect class under federal law. The prongs of the Wyoming Rational Basis Test
are: 1) What class is harmed by the legislation and has that group been subjected to a “tradition of
disfavor” by our laws?; 2) What is the public purpose that is being served by the law?; 3) What is the
characteristic of the disadvantaged class that justiﬁes the disparate treatment?; and 4) How are the
characteristics used to distinguish people for such disparate treatment relevant to the purpose that
the challenged laws purportedly intend to serve? See generally Johnson v. State Hearing Examiner’s
Ofﬁce, 838 P.2d 158 (Wyo. 1992).
252
Johnson, 838 P.2d at 160-61 (treating those of different ages differently in punishment when
caught underage with alcohol).
253
The Wyoming Juvenile Justice Statute states, “Juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction in all
cases, other than status offenses, in which a minor who has not attained the age of thirteen (13) years
is alleged to have committed a felony or a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for more than
six (6) months.” The statute then continues, “Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section,
the juvenile court has concurrent jurisdiction in all cases, other than status offenses, in which a
minor is alleged to have committed a criminal offense or to have violated a municipal ordinance.”
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-203(c), (d) (2006). This statute obviously divides juveniles into at least two
classes that are subject to disparate treatment.
254

See discussion supra Part III.F.

255

Supra notes 178-180 and accompanying text.

256

Johnson, 838 P.2d at 164-70.

257

D.D. v. City of Casper, Wyo., Seventh Judicial District Criminal Action No. 16885-A, 10
(Dec. 4, 2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-201(a)(iii) (2007) (deﬁnes a child as an individual under
the age of majority).
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treatment thus a violation of D.D.’s right to equal protection.258 The Natrona
County District Court commented that age was not a protected class and cited
a 2001 Wyoming Supreme Court Case, Misenheimer v. State.259 Misenheimer
cites a U.S. Supreme Court Case, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, to
conclude that age was not considered a class for purposes of elevating the level of
scrutiny to strict scrutiny.260 Alternatively, Johnson addressed statutes that created
unfair age classiﬁcations and disparate treatment and is the more applicable case
to address the constitutional question in D.D.
After relying upon Misenheimer, the Natrona County District Court continued
its analysis to determine if Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-203 was rationally related to a
legitimate state objective.261 The Wyoming Rational Basis Test provides for higher
constitutional scrutiny.262 According to Johnson, a statute that uses age to separate
groups that are treated disparately allows heightened scrutiny.263 Strict scrutiny is
not needed to establish an argument that the Act is unconstitutional; rather using
the Wyoming Rational Basis Test articulated in Johnson does so.264
The Johnson decision established state laws must ﬁrst be examined in light
of their corresponding state constitution because federal constitutional questions
should be avoided when legitimately possible.265 Further, state constitutions “may
be more protective of individual liberties” than federal protections.266 Johnson then
addressed the equality of all members of the human race.267 Johnson recognized
that while the federal equal protection test of strict scrutiny is designed to protect
against the distinction of race and color referred to in the Fifteenth Amendment,

258

D.D., Criminal Action No. 16885-A at 10-11.

259

Id. at 11 (citing Misenheimer v. State, 27 P.3d 273, 282 (citing Mass. Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1976))).
260
Mass. Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1976). Misenheimer is a case
involving indecent acts with a minor, and does not analyze statutes differentiating arbitrary age
groups. Id.
261

D.D., Criminal Action No. 16885-A at 11.

262

Johnson v. State Hearing Examiner’s Ofﬁce, 838 P.2d 158, 164 (Wyo. 1992).

263

Id. at 160 (discussing that the statute concerning alcohol and driver’s license suspension
was invalid as it offended the protections guaranteed within the state Bill of Rights included in the
Wyoming Constitution).
264

Id. at 166-67.

265

Id. at 164 (citing Employment Sec. Com’n of Wyo. v.W. Gas Processors, Ltd., 786 P.2d
866, 873 (Wyo. 1990)).
266

Johnson, 838 P.2d at 164 (citing Cheyenne Airport Bd. v, Rogers, 707 P.2d 717, 726 (Wyo.
1985) (internal citations omitted)).
WYO. CONST. Art. 1, § 2. (“In their inherent right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,
all members of the human race are equal.”) see generally Johnson v. State Hearing Examiner’s Ofﬁce,
838 P.2d 158 (Wyo. 1992).
267
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the test fails to protect equally against distinctions that are not speciﬁcally referred
to in the Fifteenth Amendment.268 The Johnson court made the distinction that
the Wyoming Constitution requires laws affecting rights and privileges be without
distinction of race, color, sex or “any circumstance or condition whatsoever other
than individual incompetency.”269
Additionally, the court pointed to Sanchez v. State to address the constitutional
language, ﬁnding the language should be read “so that each word or phrase has
meaning and no part is superﬂuous.”270 Case law in Wyoming establishes that the
Wyoming Constitution is “construed to protect people against legal discrimination
more robustly than does the federal constitution” in equal protection cases.271
Further, the state constitution, even at the lowest traditional scrutiny level,
empowers courts to scrutinize classiﬁcation legislation more carefully than a court
can under federal doctrine.272 In other words, Wyoming appellate courts can
look at the constitutionality of classiﬁcation legislation even more carefully than
what is allowed under the federal minimum scrutiny test.273 The Natrona County
District Court in D.D. did not use this higher level of scrutiny in its analysis.
The ﬁnding in D.D. is consistent with the idea that the person attacking the
constitutionality of a statute has the burden to prove that statute unconstitutional.274
In D.D., the Natrona County District Court departed from that reasoning and
discounted the different groups established by the juvenile justice statute when it
stated, “[t]here is no inherent right to be prosecuted as a juvenile; it is a privilege
granted by the legislature, and the legislature can restrict or qualify the privilege as
it sees ﬁt as long as no arbitrary or discriminatory classiﬁcation is implicated.”275
The Natrona County District Court held that D.D. and other juveniles under
the jurisdiction of juvenile court are similarly situated within the context of
Wyo. Stat. §14-3-105 because they come within the deﬁnition of “child.”276 This
reference to the deﬁnition of “child” is found in the statute prohibiting immoral
or indecent acts with a child and has no relevance to the Act’s disparate treatment
268
Johnson, 838 P.2d at 164-65 (citing City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473
U.S. 432 (1985)).
269

Johnson, 838 P.2d at 164-65; WYO. CONST. Art. 1, § 3.

270

Johnson, 838 P.2d at 165 (quoting Sanchez v. State, 751 P.2d 1300, 1305 (Wyo. 1988)).

271

Johnson, 838 P.2d at 165.

Id. (quoting Robert B. Keiter, An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation, XXI LAND
& WATER L. REV. 527, 553 (1986)).
272

273

Johnson, 838 P.2d at 165.

274

Compare Johnson, 838 P.2d at 165 (citing Baskin v. State ex rel. Workers Compensation
Div., 722 P.2d 151, 155 (Wyo. 1986)) with D.D. v. City of Casper, Wyo., Seventh Judicial District
Criminal Action No. 16885-A, 10 (Dec. 4, 2005) (citing Ellett v. State, 883 P.2d 940, 944 (Wyo.
1994)).
275

D.D., Criminal Action No. 16885-A at 10.

276

Id.
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and different jurisdictional qualiﬁcations of the two groups of children identiﬁed
in the Act.277
The Natrona County District Court in D.D. correctly asserted that substantial
changes in the Act are best addressed through legislative action.278 Nevertheless,
it remains the obligation of appellate courts to ensure that individuals’ rights to
equal protection and due process are not infringed upon by legislation.279 The
Natrona County District Court cited Hansen v. State, a case closely on point, to
emphasize that there is no constitutional right to be tried as an adult.280 However,
the decision in Hansen was based upon the assumption that there was no arbitrary
classiﬁcation.281 The Act and D.D. can be distinguished from Hansen since there
exists an arbitrary age classiﬁcation within the Act.282 One key distinction in
Hansen, a consolidated case involving two juveniles, is one of the juveniles was
given the opportunity to have a hearing to determine whether he should be tried
in adult court using the factors of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-237, and the other had
his original action commenced in a juvenile court.283
Additionally, both individuals in Hansen were accused of violent felony crimes
and fell within the ﬁrst group of the juvenile justice statutes that allows exclusive
jurisdiction.284 In contrast, D.D. fell into the other classiﬁcation in the juvenile
justice statutes that allows concurrent jurisdiction, and he did not have a right
to any type of transfer hearing or juvenile action.285 This is a critical difference
when examining D.D. Because Johnson contained two age classiﬁcations that
were given disparate treatment, it provides a more accurate rule to determine the
constitutionality of the Wyoming juvenile justice statutes.286 The fact remains
that the jurisdictional piece of the statute is inconsistent with the public purpose
of the Act as stated in Wyo. Stat. Ann. §14-6-201(c).287
277

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-201(a)(iii) (2007).

278

D.D., Criminal Action No. 16885-A at 14.

279

See discussion supra Part III.E.

280

D.D., Criminal Action No. 16885-A at 12 (citing Hansen v. State, 904 P.2d 811, 818 (Wyo.

1995)).
281

Hansen, 904 P.2d at 817-18 .

282

Infra note 294 and accompanying text.

283

Hansen, 904 P.2d at 814-15.

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-203(d) (2007) (“the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction . . . .”).
284

285

Id. at § 14-6-203(c) (“the juvenile court has concurrent jurisdiction . . . .”).

286

Johnson v. State Hearing Examiner’s Ofﬁce, 838 P.2d 158, 166 (Wyo. 1992).

287

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-201(c) (2007) states:
The Act is construed to effectuate the following public purposes (in part)(i): To
provide for the best interests of the child and the protection of the public and
public safety; (ii)(A)To promote the concept of punishment for criminal acts while
recognizing and distinguishing the behavior of children who have been victimized
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The Johnson court used a heightened minimum scrutiny test long articulated
by Justice Stevens, and asked four questions when confronted with an equal
protection issue.288 The Natrona County District Court in D.D. incorrectly
answered the question of whether the jurisdiction laid out in the Act was rationally
related to a legitimate state objective.289 The court then commented the state has
a legitimate interest in assuring the reservation of state resources for treatment
and physical evaluations for only those who need and will beneﬁt from them.290
Thereafter, the court concluded the statute logically stands to reason that the
differences in treatment between major crimes and minor crimes bear a rational
relationship to the objective of conservation of public resources and a reasonable
method of obtaining it.291 The correct analysis would have applied the Wyoming
Rational Basis Test and the court should have answered the questions asked in
Johnson: 1) What class is harmed by the legislation and has that group been
subjected to a “tradition of disfavor” by our laws?; 2) What is the public purpose
that is being served by the law?; 3) What is the characteristic of the disadvantaged
class that justiﬁes the disparate treatment?; and 4) How are the characteristics
used to distinguish people for such disparate treatment relevant to the purpose
that the challenged laws purportedly intend to serve?292
The answer to the ﬁrst question of what class is harmed by the legislation is
the Act creates age groups with disparate treatment based on age. Juveniles over
the age of thirteen charged with minor offenses are denied the same opportunities
for treatment and rehabilitation as those under the age of thirteen who have
been charged with a crime that may have a six month incarceration period. The
Natrona County District Court found in D.D. the state had a legitimate interest
to prevent individuals over the age of thirteen charged with minor offenses from
accessing rehabilitative resources because of the need to reserve them for those
who need and will beneﬁt from them.293 This deﬁes logic since a court would
not know who needs services unless the factors that the Natrona County District
Court found to be irrelevant were considered. The factors are not considered in
adult proceedings, yet the Natrona County District Court ruled that the state has

or have disabilities, such as serious mental illness that requires treatment; (iii)(B)
To remove. . . the taint of criminality from children committing certain unlawful
acts;(ii)(C) and, to provide treatment, training, and rehabilitation that emphasizes
the accountability and responsibility of both the parent and the child for the
child’s conduct, reduces recidivism and helps children become functioning and
contributing adults.
288
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D.D. v. City of Casper, Wyo., Seventh Judicial District Criminal Action No. 16885-A, 11
(Dec. 4, 2005).
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a legitimate interest in deciding who to help.294 These factors must be considered
in juvenile court settings to establish where the resources should be used.295
Second, the governmental purpose served by the classiﬁcation is unclear.
The Act’s purpose is extremely clear that rehabilitation is a goal, but allowing
exclusive jurisdiction for juvenile adjudication to one group and not others is
not addressed.296 The Natrona County District Court in D.D. found judicial
efﬁciency was one reason for the classiﬁcation.297
The third question in Johnson asks for identiﬁcation of the characteristic of
the group justifying disparate treatment.298 The analysis compared the disparate
treatment of those between nineteen and twenty-one years of age with those who
were older than twenty-one years of age.299 The argument asserted the difference
revolved around the degree of independence each class possessed.300 The
classiﬁcation of a statute allowing a driver’s license to be suspended based upon
one group being more dependent was found to be no more than conjecture.301
The Wyoming Supreme Court has found conjecture not enough for a statute to
categorize individuals stating, “any claim that the restriction of the law bears a
reasonable relation to a public interest must rest not on conjecture but must be
supported by something of substance.”302
Fourth, the Wyoming Supreme Court in Johnson dismissed the state’s
assumption that those younger than nineteen are less independent than those
who are nineteen or twenty years old, and determined the state would still have
to show the relevance of the characteristic to the restriction.303 By the same token,
the assumption in D.D. was anyone under thirteen years of age is more susceptible
to rehabilitation, hence exclusive jurisdiction is appropriate.304 Alternatively a

294

Id.

295

Id. The court found that the history of D.D. was of questionable relevance, yet in order to
be considered the proceedings should be in a juvenile court setting where the history and factors for
rehabilitation are considered. Id.
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Supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
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D.D., Criminal Action No. 16885-A at 11.
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Johnson v. State Hearing Examiner’s Ofﬁce, 838 P.2d 158,166-67 (Wyo. 1992).
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Id. at 167 (quoting Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67, 76-77 (Wyo. 1978)). Additionally,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY deﬁnes “conjecture as”, “[a] guess; supposition; surmise.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 868 (8th ed. 2004).
303

Johnson, 838 P.2d at 167.
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D.D. v. City of Casper, Wyo., Seventh Judicial District Criminal Action No. 16885-A at
10-11 (Dec. 4, 2005) (accepting there was no protected class and that minor crimes do not merit
juvenile treatment).
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fourteen-year-old would not have the same rehabilitative nature. It appears state
resources should not be used for fourteen to seventeen-year-olds to rehabilitate
them into law abiding, contributing adults. The Natrona County District Court
addressed this when it stated there is no need for juvenile treatment for minor
crimes, and the state has a legitimate interest to assure state resources are only used
for those that will beneﬁt from them.305 There is no substance to this assertion;
rather this decision is based on conjecture.
Nationwide studies conducted by the Department of Justice show that family
arrangements and other factors contribute to higher offense rates for offender at
seventeen years of age; therefore, it would be reasonable to allow juveniles thirteen
and older juvenile court adjudication where all “factors” could be considered in
utilizing a rehabilitative approach to reduce recidivism.306 The nationwide study
revealed the high percentage of recidivism in juvenile offenders around the age of
sixteen or seventeen.307 Perhaps mandatory adjudication in a juvenile court could
turn the tide in this trend. Numerous statistics in the nationwide study bolster a
conclusion that dealing with juveniles in a rehabilitative way may prevent future
adult offenses.308 This outcome rests on substance rather than conjecture as
required by Johnson.309
In light of statistical information and the discussion regarding juvenile
treatment for thirteen to eighteen-year-olds, it is reasonable to infer a right exists
to the environment a juvenile court provides. Johnson asserted that even if there
is a legitimate assumption by the state to distinguish groups by age, the state is
still required to show the relevance of these age speciﬁc distinctions.310 The statute
states only those juvenile delinquents under the age of thirteen have the right to
exclusive jurisdiction by the juvenile court. Statistical data supports juveniles up to
the age of eighteen beneﬁtting from adjudication in the juvenile court system.311
The division between juveniles under the age of thirteen and those over thirteen is
counter-productive and counter-intuitive. The differentiation does not comport
with the goals of the Act.312 Using the Johnson minimum scrutiny analysis, the
differentiation between groups does not pose a special threat to the government’s
legitimate interest and therefore is unconstitutional.313
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The Johnson court found that the controlling statute violated equal
protection.314 Under the four-question analysis, there is strong support the age
division in the Act violates equal protection and due process of those individuals
who do not have the right to juvenile justice court unless a prosecutor chooses to
adjudicate them in a juvenile justice system.

IV. CONCLUSION
Wyoming’s Juvenile Justice Act is ﬂawed and change is needed. Parents have
a duty to appear with their child in a juvenile delinquency proceeding and are
parties in a juvenile matter. In D.D., the parents were not made aware that their
child had committed a crime until he had been arrested on a bench warrant.
This forced D.D.’s parents to violate the Wyoming Statute that states it is the
responsibility of “one (1) or both parents to appear . . . when the minor is required
to appear and is alleged to have committed a criminal offense or to have violated a
municipal ordinance.”315 In re Gault provides the authority to assure this does not
occur.
Juveniles have a right to juvenile adjudication. The appropriate means to
command the appearance of a juvenile in adult court is through transfer from
juvenile court to adult court. The discretion on whether or not to transfer a
juvenile should rest with the judge, not a prosecutor or law enforcement ofﬁcer.
Due process is a fundamental right that must be afforded to all juveniles in
Wyoming as articulated by Kent and In re Gault. D.D. did not have an opportunity
to beneﬁt from the rehabilitative nature of juvenile court when the discretion was
left to the police ofﬁcer who required D.D. to appear in municipal court. Similarly,
absolute discretion granted to prosecutors to determine the court of adjudication
for juveniles is problematic. This discretion has been found constitutional by the
Wyoming Supreme Court, but applying the Wyoming Rational Basis Test reveals
that the present Act is unconstitutional and violates juveniles’ rights to due process
and equal protection.
Concurrent jurisdiction in the statute separates juveniles into two different
groups, one of which is afforded the absolute right to be adjudicated in a juvenile
court, and the other that is seldom afforded the rehabilitative nature of the Juvenile
Justice Act Statutes. Concurrent jurisdiction is self-defeating and does not support
the goals of the Act to treat juveniles in a rehabilitative way. The Tenth Circuit
emphasized the importance of preventing a juvenile from adjudication in an
adult court “without ceremony—without hearing, without effective assistance of

314
Id. at 180-81 (discussing that the statute deprived plaintiffs of equal protection or due process in violation of the Wyoming Constitution); See WYO. CONST. Art. 1, § 2 “Equality of all.” Id.
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counsel, without a statement of reasons.” Concurrent jurisdiction allows absolute
prosecutorial discretion. In some instances, ofﬁcers choose the court where a
juvenile will be adjudicated. This is unconstitutional and does not comply with
the purposes of the Act.
The responsibility to correct these constitutional breaches may lie with the
legislature, but Wyoming Courts should also acknowledge the unconstitutionality
of the Act. With ninety-seven percent of juvenile offenders being adjudicated in
adult courts, in Natrona County, it is apparent that Wyoming’s Juvenile Justice
Act fails the majority of them. The D.D. decision is an example where the court
system failed a juvenile, a failure that happens far too frequently. Wyoming’s
Juvenile Justice Act is illegal and unconstitutional. The Wyoming Legislature and
Wyoming Courts must closely examine Wyoming’s “Outlaw” Juvenile Justice Act
when addressing youthful offenders, and make the necessary changes to ensure
that juveniles’ rights are preserved.
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